Category: Theory

Much of what I write is structured around theories of strategy and management. The word theory gets a bad reputation among managers because it’s associated with the word “theoretical” which connotes impractical. But a theory is a very practical thing because it’s a statement of causality. Causality means you don’t have to collect experimental evidence on whether when you jump out of a window you fall or not. There is a theory about gravity which you can use to your advantage.

So even though they scorn talk of theory, managers use theory all the time. Whenever a rational manager takes any action, it’s predicated on a theory already in their head. Whenever they put forward a business plan they are employing a theory that if they do these things they will be successful.

The problem is that much of what passes for business debate is the stacking of theories on either side of an argument. Unfortunately most of these theories are not much more than anecdotes. To say that “open always wins” is a theory but it’s usually backed only by one or two examples without a list of counter-examples. That’s not to pick on “open” as there are many more deeply flawed theories (e.g. the stupid manager theory of business failure) which have no evidence whatsoever to support them and all the evidence in the world to disprove them and yet they retain the highest popularity.

So the problem with management “science” is that most managers are not aware of what theories they are employing, treating them more like intuition or some God-given insight. They also don’t know whether or to what extent their theories are good or bad. They also don’t have access to a body of data that supports or challenges their theories. Business data is often locked away even from employees of the company producing such data. It’s buried so effectively that it’s often forgotten and has to be re-generated every time a new management team takes over. Corporations effectively kill self-knowledge and lack any institutional memory.

To illustrate the effect I can offer personal testimony. When working at my last job I spent a great deal of salaried time collecting data and presenting it. Much like what is presented in this unsalaried blog. The difference is that when a “work product” was done (almost always in the form of Powerpoint slideware), it would be released to the audience which requested it. This audience could be as small as one person or as large at a few dozen. But once consumed by the audience, the product had a half-life of about a week. It would be literally forgotten in a month. Now this could be used to one’s advantage as every few months a smart analyst could dust off some old product and re-release it to the amazement of another audience or even to the same audience who had forgotten. Taken to extremes, you can envision a Dilbert-like scenario where the analyst is like Wally who has a perpetual salary for repeating ancient knowledge.

The reason this model for analysis fails is because information is rationed in corporations. The transmission, dissemination, storage and consumption of information is intentionally constrained. This makes the work of an analyst nearly useless. I finally became disillusioned with the process when, at one point in time, having worked on one piece of analysis for two weeks on the premise that it would be presented at a high-level meeting, my time slot got bumped off the agenda due to scheduling issues. My work was never presented to anyone.

It was at that time that I realized that my “work product” was non-essential to the meeting anyway. It was, for the lack of a better word, executive entertainment. So, naturally, realizing that I was really an entertainer I resolved to become better at it. That led me to target not those who request the work, but the largest audience possible because they would give me better feedback. I began to blog internally.

Calling analysis entertainment may sound flippant, but at a more core level, it’s actually an enlightened way to see the process. Steve Jobs is an executive but his skill at entertaining an audience is what makes him an effective communicator with huge consequences to his firm. In olden days CEOs were lauded for their problem solving skills, then for their sales skills, but now they need to be “charismatic” and therefore entertaining.

This blog is an experiment in the opening of business theory and the open exchange of insights. In doing so I take a look at keeping the work relevant by making it approachable, illuminating and, yes, entertaining. So I went from a salaried producer of analysis for a small and forgetful audience to an unsalaried producer of analysis for a large audience in a format that encourages memory. A company was paying a lot of money for something that it ignored. I now receive no income for work that is (hopefully) ravenously consumed. I rather like this more.

When I started this blog I chose a word “asymco” which did not exist and had exactly zero hits on Google search. Now I’m glad to see that “asymco” has 77,300 results on Google search. I am grateful to all who have helped in making this possible and I’m looking forward to further collaboration.

The iTunes app store has gone over 310k apps approved and has 250k apps in its catalog. The Android Market, in spite of (or perhaps because of) an abundance of copyright infringements, is growing nearly as quickly. According to at least one source, there are over 130k apps.

The way to study these two catalogs is to look at the number of new applications being approved (or added) on a monthly basis.

Even better would be to index to the same starting date, as in the following chart.

The Android Market grew grew more slowly than the iTunes store for the first two years but has accelerated to nearly the same rate now. Meanwhile, the iTunes Store has shown seasonality around the holidays (though we’ll have to see if it repeats this year) and has held fairly steady at 20k/mo.

The policies are also shifting: On one hand, Apple has also signaled that they are not willing to accept “me-too” copies of simple apps. On the other hand they clarified policies and began to allow interpreted code apps. Google has not yet reacted to infringements on its store but it’s probable that they will have to respond with some policing as download volumes grow.

The fact that the Android store is not policed or curated reduces the barrier to listing for developers and, in theory, should encourage a more rapid add rate. But the Star system of the iTunes store encourages more attempts to find hit apps. So in many ways we see that the two have an orthogonal approach:

• The iTunes store is a hit-driven star system with long tail paid app value model
• The Android Market is a flea market model with an ad-supported value model

There are few conclusions we can draw at this time about long term sustainability–after all these are ongoing and fairly young experiments.  It does seem that both platforms are attractive enough today to create critical masses of apps, perhaps exactly because they don’t put forward the same value model.

As previously described in an earlier piece on the transistor, there is a theory that underlies much of what this web diary is about. Telecommunications is undergoing wrenching change. And not for the first time. The history of the industry is filled with disruption and thus with drama that leads to fine storytelling.

One such great story is that of Western Union and the telegraph.

Western Union was formed as a company in 1851 and ten years later had completed the first transcontinental telegraph line. Following on that breakthrough, it introduced the first digital real-time data service, the stock ticker, in 1866. Business boomed and by 1870 it was the world’s most powerful telecommunications company.

By any standards it was innovative: it offered remarkable and revolutionary telecom data services, a century before the Internet. But in the century that followed why didn’t Western Union become the leader in voice communications, ceding that position to the Bell companies?

Alexader Graham Bell did not invent the voice telephone with the intention of toppling Western Union. In the language of today’s technology entrepreneurship he hoped Western Union would be his “exit”. He pitched the phone to them as an improvement to their core telegraphy business. Bell offered the patents for the telephone to Western Union for a mere $100,000, roughly $2 million in today’s dollars. In other words, today the deal would be: two million dollars to own all voice IP.

Western Union passed

Now why would they do that? Imagine you are an analyst at Western Union advising management on technology acquisition and M&A. What process would you use to evaluate it? First, most obviously, you would try to get feedback from marketing and sales. They should go out and survey their customer base to find out who would be interested and how much they would be willing to pay.

The sales force would naturally seek out their best customers and ask them first. Those customers were the stock ticker users. They were extremely voracious users of the ticker tape system. It should be no surprise why we have “ticker tape parades”–there was enough of the stuff lying around offices in New York to shower down and flood Broadway end-to-end”. Ticker tape was a boon to merchants and traders. Chicago would know what’s happening in the New York stock exchange instantaneously. Price data was traveling at the speed of light.  The sender and receiver were in lock-step sync. To suggest to these customers a voice product would sound like a step backward. Why would they want to talk to the other party? The data was coming on tape and it was also recorded for posterity. Speaking with the other person meant confusion and delay and a mess of record keeping.

The word from the customers would be a resounding negative.

Second would be the business model.  How would you charge for voice? Data was subscription based, and the fees were huge. Voice would be metered and the price low. If targeting consumers, telegrams were priced by the word, but you couldn’t price voice by the word. Marketing would stare back at you as if you had committed a judgement error.

Thirdly you would look at the cost side. Operations would give you more bad news. Voice technology was different enough that it needed new infrastructure. Switchboards, operators, handsets and new power and insulator requirements were all expensive and had no clear return. Voice was a loser all around.

So the decision was perfectly reasonable, smart even.

This is not to suggest that Western Union did not accept any new technology or invest in it. For decades after the phone, Western Union continued to invest in innovation: It introduced an electronic payment system (called money transfer) in 1871. In 1914 it offered the first charge card and in 1923 it introduced teletypewriters. Singing telegrams followed in 1933 and fax service in 1935. Intercity wireless microwave communications were introduced in 1943. Telex came in 1958 and the product of marketing genius, the ‘Candygram’ in the 1960s. By 1964 its network was all wireless using a transcontinental microwave system. Western Union became the first American telecommunications corporation to maintain its own fleet of geosynchronous communication satellites, starting in 1974. The fleet of satellites, called Westar, carried communications within the Western Union company for telegram and mailgram message data to Western Union bureaus nationwide.

And it wasn’t lacking in talent either. Western Union had the best telecom managers in the business and was raking in profits to fund expansion. It attracted the best and brightest engineers for generations. Western Union probably passed on hundreds of other inventions and ideas, and rightly so.

So what happened to WU?

It’s still around. However, due to declining profits and mounting debts, Western Union slowly began to divest itself of telecommunications-based assets starting in the early 1980s. Due to deregulation in the US, Western Union began sending money outside the country, re-inventing itself as “The fastest way to send money worldwide”. In 1987, an individual investor acquired control of Western Union through an outside of chapter 11 process that was a complex leveraged recapitalization. After several other changes in ownerships and moves through bankruptcy, WU is now a public company with an enterprise value of about $12 billion based entirely on international money transfer business.

3G as a disruptive technology

Today we’ve come around full circle. Whereas voice was disruptive to a data network provider in the 20th century, data is disruptive to a voice network provider in the 21st. The mis-application of 3G network technology to sustain voice-oriented business models gives one a strong sense of déjà vu.

The telecom world moved swiftly to 1G and 2G cellular voice. Each new generation of mobile telecom was sustaining the core business model of subscriptions feeding centrally managed networks and symbiotic device vendors benefiting from handset and switching system upgrades. Standardization, international expansion, lower price points and network effects made this industry the most ubiquitous technology distributor the world had ever seen.

3G however was different. It was effectively mobile broadband data. It enabled data services to be de-coupled from the network operators. IP protocols did not require the servers to be located on operator premises or even to be managed or monitored by them. Devices could be general purpose computers not specific purpose communicators. Incumbents did not adapt to this well.  They continued to build business plans according to a central-switch blueprint.

So although incumbents did not reject the smartphone as a technology, they tried to make it sustaining when plainly it isn’t. They essentially tried to cram it into their business models.

The struggle to keep the service structure of telecom centered around the network operator will continue, but short of pulling the plug on 3G and LTE, there is little that the incumbents can do to stop it.

So what’s the lesson?

Some technologies are embraced and some are rejected. You can’t fault every rejection and you can’t praise every acceptance. The most likely reason for embracing something is that it helps grow your existing business. The most likely reason for rejection is that it may harm your business. Even acceptance sometimes leads to mis-application in sustaining the core rather than planning for its demise.

The decision on how to handle something new and potentially disruptive requires a different sense of what’s right and wrong about it.

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Photo: Former headquarters of WU, located at 60 Hudson, New York.

By request, a list of some of my favorite asymco articles.

Asymco Favorites

With 50 million clients installed likely this year, FaceTime is a service which may have potential.  By potential I mean, of course, its potential to make a dent in the universe, the universal goal Jobs has set for Apple so many years ago.

It’s entirely possible that FaceTime will be an inconsequential nice-to-have enhancement to the iPhone platform that sustains and improves the iOS (and OSX) franchise. But it’s also entirely possible that FaceTime could become a disruptive challenger to the functional voice-oriented telecom network.

What you choose to measure determines what you know

The thing that jumps out at me is the service’s under-performance along metrics that the industry defines as critical but over-performance on dimensions that the industry considers non-critical.

It suffers from poor coverage (WiFi only), a limited network of possible users, high bandwidth requirements which are still hard to match and a steep price point for initial entry.

But I would say data-oriented devices were similarly met with poor performance 4 to 5 years ago. No 3G, poor coverage, few services and high prices. Even today there are many telecom skeptics who think smartphones are toys for the well-to-do or IT types and not something for the mass market.  As can be easily seen however, all the shortcomings of the mobile-data-oriented-device (aka smartphone) turned out to get ironed out with time. You just need to plot a historic graph of network performance and device price points to see where they’re going to go.

On the other side of the equation FaceTime offers huge performance on the dimension of emotional attachment to a device and to a conversation. The FaceTime experience is qualitatively distinct from either desktop video chat or device-based VoIP. It’s intimate, emotional and stirring, (just look at the commercial) not to mention accessible by just about anyone. These new measures of performance cannot yet be quantified with spreadsheets and measuring the effect will not be a priority for anyone in the industry for a long time to come. Therefore, the asymmetry is there implicitly.

So here we have classic Apple: shifting of the basis of competition so subtly that it’s almost imperceptible while under way yet glaringly obvious after the fact.

So what does FaceTime have to do with FaceBook?

When FaceBook launched, I don’t recall observers predicting that a site allowing college students to keep track of their friends after graduation would grow into the stickiest site by time spent online ever seen. Nor that it would become a site that swallowed all online communications including IM and email. Nor a site that would possibly challenge search consumption. The performance attributes that FaceBook relied on were not in algorithms but in the emotional hooks that relationships have with people. FaceBook was personal, emotive and private, the exact opposite of what the Web offered a decade ago.

So, like the names imply, both these services are about Faces, the first objects we as humans recognized after birth. That’s a powerful image to have a handle on.

The pattern that emerges is that Web 2.0, Telecom 2.0 and Personal Computing 2.0 will pivot on the elevation of emotion over function. That may be a banality but empires have been built on less.

I am taking a comment thread and promoting it to an article so as to expose it to a larger audience. There are two points of view:

Ariel writes:

I believe that next year and perhaps the year after that will see intense competition on the OS platform front, but eventually one will dominate the other(s) by a significant margin (and this also depends on the cloud and how it will be adopted across platforms). This happens as a result of a unified platform in which many can compete on lower margins instead of the development of the entire package and platform, which all goes hand in hand with commoditization.

However, to predict that smartphones will not be commoditized within the next three years is bold to say the least. The desktop was settled very quickly, and in this industry of exponential growth, it can be assumed it will not take longer for a similar scenario to settle.

I reply:

I’ve been observing (professionally) the smartphone market from its inception and was holding my breath for the commoditization of handsets that Microsoft promised all the way from 2004 through 2009. Several generations of Windows Mobile were predicated on the imminent stabilization of hardware and user experiences years before the iPhone came along. Not only Microsoft but Palm via PalmSource, Symbian as a consortium of all incumbents, Sun & IBM via Java, DoCoMo with iMode and not least of all, Qualcomm with BREW all made the same bets and ran with horizontal strategies toward a smartphone future built on the lessons of the PC industry. The only holdout for the integrated approach was the one company that everybody marked for dead: RIM. It’s also the only one who raked in all the profits.

All this happened before 2007.

To suggest that this time, in 2010, it’s different: that the definition of the smartphone as it exists today is the product at its zenith; that user experiences and expectations and hardware specifications and platform dynamics will be henceforth frozen with minor sustaining tweaks to look forward to is, in my opinion, a far riskier bet.

I don’t try to be a futurist or predictor of how the product will evolve, but I can see a dozen ways of how the very definition of a smartphone will change and how in 4 years we’ll have products that won’t be recognizable as such today.

So much depends on when the smartphone (or more broadly mobile computing) reaches this point of good enough. It’s at the root of all hypotheses of how the market will evolve.

The new Apple TV has created a cottage industry of pundits debating the future ownership of your living room. This topic of to whom your living room belongs has been around since the 90’s when Microsoft sought to plant a flag on your TV set and claim it in the name of Gates with a cable box software platform. A few billion dollars later they came away with not a single deed, not even to your couch.

Talk of ownership flared up again in the last decade as various game consoles and boxes paraded in front of consumers. There were wars waged over DVD formats, encoding formats and DRM. Then came hulu and Apple TV and roku and who knows what else I missed.

It’s all bound to go badly. Here’s why this property will remain off limits:

• The ownership is not for the space but for the time and attention of the audience. The time spent consuming televised content is what’s at stake.
• That time is increasingly being fragmented. It was first broken into tiny pieces by cable channels that divided audiences into niches.
• Erosion of cohesive audiences continued with DVD rentals and Netflix. Home theaters ate into both broadcast and outside-the-home entertainment
• Attention was attacked with PVRs like Tivo.
• Demographics were exploded with game consoles with age groups separating into different modes of consumption.
• Migration of other portable devices like laptops, smartphones and iPads into the couch room are now further degrading the value of the “living room” as a significant target for advertisers.
• Internationally there never was a unified living room. Consumption patterns and even broadcast business models vary widely.

Ultimately there’s really nothing in “the living room” worth fighting for. The disruptive play here is the crumbling of monolithic audiences that used to define “prime time”. It’s not a new box to take over from another box.

The technologies that are coming to invade the living room have already broken it into parcels that lack cohesion.

Just like the division of land among numerous generations of heirs creates land only useful for residential development, it’s time to abandon dreams of owning the farm. That farm has long ago stopped being fertile.